LY ALSO KNOWN AS YZ (OR ZY) AGAINST THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT [2019] ScotCS CSOH

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[1] In the early hours of 24 August 2014, the petitioner found herself on the streets of

Glasgow, barefoot and in a state of distress. She sought the assistance of a passer-by who

called the police on her account. The police attended and spoke with the petitioner who said

that she was LY, a national of China, born in September 1993. She was traumatised and it

was difficult to engage with her, but in due course she was referred via the National Referral

Mechanism to the Home Office as a potential victim of trafficking. On 28 August 2014, the

Home Office, as Competent Authority, concluded that there were reasonable grounds to

[2] On 6 March 2018, the Home Office, as Competent Authority, conclusively recognised

the petitioner as a victim of trafficking in relation to her experiences in the United Kingdom

but not as a victim of trafficking in Denmark and China. She was granted discretionary

leave to remain until March 2019. On 16 March 2018 the petitioner was refused asylum on

the basis that there would be a sufficiency of protection on her return to China. These

proceedings do not relate to the refusal of the petitioner’s claim for asylum which is subject

[3] In this petition for judicial review the petitioner ostensibly seeks declarator to the

 that the petitioner in relation to her departure from China and entry to and

However, in the course of the hearing before me on 10 January 2018, Ms Irvine invited the

court instead to reduce the decision of 6 March 2018 insofar as expressed in the following

“It has therefore been decided that you are not a victim of human trafficking from

China to Denmark for the purposes of forced labour or sexual exploitation.”

[4] Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011

on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and

replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, provides in Article 2:

1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons,

including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the

threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,

of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of

payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another

2. A position of vulnerability means a situation in which the person concerned has

no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.

3. Exploitation shall include, as a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of

others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, including

begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the exploitation of

4. The consent of a victim of trafficking in human beings to the exploitation,

whether intended or actual, shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in

5. When the conduct referred to in paragraph 1 involves a child, it shall be a

punishable offence of trafficking in human beings even if none of the means set forth

6. For the purpose of this Directive, ‘child’ shall mean any person below 18 years

[5] The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings

(the Trafficking Convention) was ratified by the UK on 1 April 2009. It provides in Article 4:

a ‘Trafficking in human beings’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,

harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other

forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a

position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to

achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose

of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,

slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

b The consent of a victim of ‘trafficking in human beings’ to the intended

exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any

c The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the

purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in human beings’ even if this

does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

e ‘Victim’ shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human

[6] As part of implementing its obligations under the Trafficking Convention, the UK

government created the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) in 2009.

[7] The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides in Article 4:

2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

3. For the purpose of this Article the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall not

(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed

according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional

(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in

countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military

(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.”

[8] In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1 the ECtHR held that trafficking

within the scope of Article 4(a) of the Trafficking Convention falls within the scope of the

ECHR Article 4 prohibition of slavery and forced labour. In paragraph 288 the Court

explained that Article 4 entails a procedural obligation to investigate situations of potential

trafficking which must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the

individuals responsible. It may extend to taking operational measures to protect victims or

potential victims of trafficking, paragraph 286, subject to questions of proportionality in the

application and prioritisation of resources. In paragraph 289 the Court explained that

Member States are obliged in cross-border trafficking cases to co-operate effectively with the

[9] The Home Office publishes guidance based on the Trafficking Convention, “Victims

of modern slavery – Competent Authority Guidance,” of which Version 3, issued on

21 March 2016, was in force on 6 March 2018. It is a substantial document which gives

information to staff in the Competent Authorities in the Home Office and UK Human

Trafficking Centre to help them decide whether a person referred under the NRM is a victim

[10] At page 28 of the guidance certain myths about modern slavery are identified and

discussed, the first of which is, “The person did not take opportunities to escape so is not

being coerced.” It is then explained that whilst remaining in an exploitative situation could

indicate a willingness to remain there and/or an absence of coercion there can be many other

reasons why someone may choose not to escape such a situation including fear of reprisal

for self or family, vulnerability and lack of knowledge of one’s environment.

“As noted in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

‘An important aspect of this definition is an understanding of trafficking as a process

comprising a number of interrelated actions rather than a single act at a given point

in time. Once initial control is secured, victims are generally moved to a place where

there is a market for their services, often where they lack language skills and other

basic knowledge that would enable them to seek help. While these actions can all

take place within one country’s borders, they can also take place across borders with

the recruitment taking place in one country and the act of receiving the victim and

the exploitation taking place in another. Whether or not an international border is

crossed, the intention to exploit the individual concerned underpins the entire

[12] The guidance identifies from the terms of the Trafficking Convention that modern

slavery includes human trafficking and identifies the essential components of action, means

and the purpose of exploitation before noting that in the case of a child there need not have

been any means because a child cannot give informed consent. Accordingly, the guidance

“A potential victim of trafficking who may have been a victim as a child, but [is] only

identified and referred into the NRM after reaching adulthood is treated under child

criteria in assessing whether they were trafficked. The practical effect of this is that

[13] Also at page 32, the guidance notes that physical coercion as a means includes threat

[14] Commencing at page 97, guidance is given about the assessment of credibility and

competent authorities are enjoined to consider both the external and internal credibility of

material facts. The competent authority must take into account mitigating circumstances

including trauma, feelings of shame and painful memories which may provide reasons why

a potential victim of trafficking may be incoherent, inconsistent or delays in giving details of

material facts. The effects of trauma on consistency and lack of detail are identified but it is

also noted that a victim of trafficking is likely to be able to describe what they saw, heard,

felt and thought about events in a way which someone who has not had such experiences

As a result of trauma, victims in some cases might not be able to recall concrete dates

and facts and in some cases their initial account might contradict their later

statement. This may be connected to their traumatic experience. However, the need

to be sensitive does not remove the need to assess all information critically and

objectively when the Competent Authority considers the credibility of a case.”

In submissions, counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the first two sentences.

Counsel for the respondent observed that the final sentence is also important and should not

[16] The petitioner maintains that she is LY, born in September 1993 in Jilin Province, in

the north-east of China where the languages spoken are Mandarin and Korean. She says

that when she was 6 she moved with her mother, who had remarried, to Guangdong

Province in the south-west of China where the languages spoken are Cantonese and

Mandarin. The petitioner’s stepfather physically and sexually abused her as a child.

[17] The petitioner claims that in or around 2009, when she was 15, she was sold by her

stepfather to an organised criminal gang as payment for debt and left China without her

mother after the Chinese New Year. She was taken by car to an airport in China but she was

not able to say what airport it was or give any details about it. She was taken to Denmark.

The petitioner was accompanied on the flight to Denmark by a man called A Zhen. She was

sedated. The petitioner was met at the airport in Denmark by a man called A Nai under

whose control she was kept throughout her time in Denmark. He enrolled her in classes at a

design and technology school, under an alias identity which would later come to be

identified to the petitioner as YZ or ZY with a date of birth in August 1990. She was taught

in a language which she did not understand. Whilst enrolled in the school and thereafter,

she was forcibly prostituted by Mr Nai who also forced her to work in the evenings at a

restaurant and as a night cleaner in a hospital. She was told that if she did not comply her

mother would be harmed. She was physically threatened and her finger was cut with a

[18] The petitioner says that she was taken to London in 2010 under the YZ alias identity

when she was about 16. Mr Nai accompanied her on the flight to London during which she

was again sedated and he took her to a house in a place which she later learned was London.

The petitioner was forced to work as a prostitute there and elsewhere on a daily basis over

the course of four years. In August 2014 she was driven to Scotland in order to have sex

with a particular client but she escaped after a fight broke out between the client and the

petitioner’s driver in the early hours of 24 August 2014 when she made contact with the

[19] The respondent accepted that the petitioner had been ill-treated and sexually abused

by her stepfather as a child in China but did not consider that that part of her account

[20] The respondent accepted evidence, and its import, from a clinical psychologist,

Dr Sharon Doherty, who reported in 2015 after examining the petitioner and reviewing the

available information since her arrival in the UK. Dr Doherty concluded that the petitioner

continued to experience core PTSD symptoms of intrusions, hyperarousal, avoidance of

trauma reminders and symptoms of low mood, albeit the frequency of symptoms was

reducing over time. The petitioner was observed to employ a lot of energy to avoid difficult

feelings and memories such that when reminded of memories of her trafficking and the loss

of her mother she became low, tearful and fearful. She was considered to meet the

[21] When the petitioner’s fingerprints were taken in November 2014, they were found to

match a UK Visa application submitted in Denmark in 2010 in the name YZ, Chinese

national born in August 1990. A bank statement and a letter of support from Kea

“University”, Copenhagen were submitted along with the visa application which also

disclosed that a previous passport issued to YZ had expired so that a renewal passport had

been sought and issued at the Chinese Embassy in Copenhagen. Investigations established

that the visa application was submitted in person at the British Embassy in Copenhagen on

28 June 2010 and that fingerprints were taken and processed. A particular Chinese passport

in the name YZ was submitted in support of the application. The passport had been issued

by the Chinese Embassy in Copenhagen on 16 November 2009. This must have required

personal attendance at the Chinese Embassy by the petitioner who must have produced

[22] The petitioner has denied knowledge of obtaining a passport in this identity and of

the visa application. All that the petitioner had been able to say about this was that she had

had her photograph taken on one occasion in a building in Copenhagen which looked like a

shop. She made no reference to renewing her passport and applying for a visa at the

Chinese and British embassies in Copenhagen. The petitioner has not produced to the

respondent any evidence from the Chinese Embassy in the UK to support her true identity

[23] The relevant decisions were given in two letters dated 6 March 2018. Acceptance

that the petitioner was the victim of trafficking in relation to her experiences in the UK was

set out in a three page letter. In a detailed letter of 22 pages (the decision letter), the

allocated NRM case-worker explained why it was not accepted that the petitioner was a

victim of trafficking from China to Denmark for the purposes of forced labour or sexual

[24] The decision letter commences by noting the petitioner’s details as YZ also known as

LY and notes that she is from China, female and the dates of birth associated with both

identities are noted. There is a brief synopsis of the petitioner’s account followed by an

extensive list of the materials considered. The decision-maker proceeds to set out a

structured assessment of the available information, the law, relevant guidance and reasons

for the conclusions reached. The fundamental difficulty for the petitioner, as explained at

page 11, was that the decision-maker did not accept the credibility of her account in material

respects and accordingly attached little weight to evidence emanating from her in those

respects. The reasons for this assessment, and its legal effect, were explained in detail

[25] At pages 15-17 the petitioner’s account is considered in the light of information

submitted in support of the ZY visa application relating to Kea “University”, information

obtained from Kea and inferences drawn therefrom. The decision-maker concluded that the

petitioner must have applied prior to 15 March 2009 for a 2 year programme for which the

entrance requirements appear to include at least 1 year of higher education. She could not

have started the course before the summer intake in 2009. At page 16 there is a

consideration of reasons why it would not be possible to register at Kea in the name YZ and

remain unaware of the YZ identity. The petitioner’s account that she did not know the name

of Kea or its location was found implausible given her statements that at times she travelled

there alone by public transport. The interrelationship of the time when the petitioner must

have ceased studying at Kea is noted not to fit with her statement of when she came to the

UK. At page 17 the petitioner’s account that she did not know the location of a Chinese

Restaurant where she said she was forced to work, or where she had lived, but to and from

where she said that she travelled alone was not considered plausible.

The grounds on which the decisions are challenged and the position of parties

[26] Founding on Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 4546

Ms Irvine contended that the decision-maker had erred in law by failing to apply the

 Failing to recognise trafficking as a process and compartmentalising the

assessment of the petitioner’s history. In particular, on the petitioner’s account Mr

Nai featured both as controlling the petitioner in Denmark and bringing her to

London and taking her to a house there. Having accepted these facts in relation to

the UK, the decision-maker had erred in failing to give effect to their significance

 Overestimating and misapplying the significance of the petitioner not being

subject to control at all times in Denmark given the definition of “means” and the

 This is also said to be an error of law over and above a failure to follow guidance.

 Failure to take account of the petitioner’s diagnosis of PTSD and her account that

she was at times sedated and rejecting the significance of the mitigating

circumstances provided by PTSD by rejecting the medical evidence on the basis

that there was no suggestion that the petitioner suffers from cognitive

[27] It was said to have been irrational to accept the petitioner’s evidence as to how she

arrived in the UK with a person implicitly accepted to be her trafficker whilst rejecting her

[28] The second general attack related to the question of the petitioner’s identity.

[29] Ms Irvine submitted that the respondent had attached significance to the ZY passport

being genuine without noticing that it might be a genuine document obtained by fraudulent

means or a genuine document which had been altered, and in doing so failed to give effect

to guidance, including Home Office Country Information for China and readily

[30] It was also said to have been a material error to fail to take account of the positive

outcome of a “telephone identity interview” conducted with the petitioner on 10 March

[31] Ms Irvine departed from any reliance on Article 8 of the ECHR. Whilst the petition

referred to a number of international legal instruments being violated by the respondent,

ultimately there was no separate argument presented. Ms Irvine contended that through

whichever legal lens the situation was examined, the same errors had been made by the

[32] Ms Irvine did not seek to maintain that the respondent was at fault by refraining

from carrying out further investigation into the petitioner’s true identity.

[33] Ms Irvine did not seek to make anything of information referred to in the amended

paragraph 6 of the petition as having been obtained in November 2018, accepting that it had

not been before the decision maker and that if the petitioner wishes to make anything of it

[34] Both Ms Irvine and Mr Webster adopted and expanded on their notes of argument

and I have considered all of the written and oral submissions made on either side.

[35] Mr Webster accepted that a failure to follow relevant departmental guidance would

in the circumstances of this case amount to the kind of legal error at common law which

would permit the court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and I proceed on that basis.

[36] Parties agreed that I should approach the case on the footing that there was a need:

”for decisions to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in favour of an

applicant has been properly taken into account” the approach proposed by LJ Carnwath in

R (YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] 4 All ER 448 at paragraph 24 and

adopted in the trafficking context by Sir Stephen Silber in R (SF (St Lucia)) v Home

[37] As Mr Webster observed, this approach recognises a requirement for materiality; it

is factors which might tell in favour of the applicant which must be shown by reasoning to

have been properly taken into account. It remains the case that there must be an error of law

before the court can intervene, mere disagreement with the decision cannot be sufficient as

Sir John Dyson explained in giving the judgment of the Supreme Court in MA (Somalia) v

Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraphs 43-45 albeit he was

[38] I do not accept the contention that the petitioner erred in law by failing to treat the

petitioner as a child when considering if her account of what occurred in China and

Denmark constituted trafficking. At page 7-8 of the decision letter the nature of human

trafficking per the Trafficking Convention is summarised and the different assessment

[39] At pages 18-21, the Trafficking Convention criteria of (a) action, (b) means and

decision-maker recognised that if the petitioner was under 18 at the material times, which

she would have been if she is LY born September 1993, “means” would not need to feature.

At page 19, in relation to China, the decision-maker states in terms: “Therefore you are not

required to meet part ‘b’ for this aspect of your account.” The conclusion reached was that

in China, the petitioner was a victim of child abuse but not human trafficking.

[40] For Denmark, whilst the description of the process could have been better expressed

on page 20, it is nevertheless made clear that the decision-maker proceeded on the

hypothesis, derived from the LY identity, that the petitioner was a child in Denmark so that

the “means” criterion was not applicable. The assessment at page 20 of whether the means

criterion was made out is explicitly stated to have been considered, “for the sake for

[41] There are a number of references to the petitioner not being subject to control at all

times in Denmark, but they should be understood in context. The first point to note is that,

whilst the guidance identifies the proposition that a person did not take an opportunity to

escape means that they were not coerced as a myth, it also acknowledges that it is

nevertheless capable of pointing in that direction as I have noted above at para [10]. The

decision maker took care to note that the petitioner’s account included:

“You claim to have been threatened that your mother would be harmed if you failed

to comply with your alleged traffickers demands. You also claim to have been

beaten and further claim to have been locked within two premises in Denmark.”

[42] Having made that observation, the letter continued at page 20 (albeit this section was

“…It is noted you travelled alone, by public transport to and from university,

therefore you had either access to funds to purchase a travel ticket or you had a

You also claim to have to have travelled to the unknown Chinese restaurant or

takeaway alone. Furthermore, your account of travelling to various establishments

alone contradicts your claim to have been locked within premises at two unknown

In line with the assessment above, it is not considered you experienced a threat or

use of force or other form of coercion with regards to this aspect of your account.”

[43] This passage is an illustration of what I consider to be the second and more

important point. I apprehend that reference to the petitioner not being under control at all

times in Denmark is primarily considered, alongside other pertinent facts and inferences

relating to Denmark, and internal contradictions within the petitioner’s account, as

undermining the credibility of the petitioner’s claim to have been trafficked in Denmark.

[44] The decision-maker was aware from the materials before her that the petitioner

claimed to have been sedated at certain times and made explicit reference to this at pages 3

and 5 of the decision letter. This did not disentitle the decision-maker from considering that

the absence of any detail about the airport from which she left China was surprising and a

weakness in her account, particularly when viewed alongside other objective facts which

cast doubt on the petitioner’s account of the circumstances in which she came to be in

Denmark. This assessment at the foot of page 17, which was not particularly fundamental,

was made against a background of mitigating circumstances having been acknowledged.

[45] The medical information generally, and that from Dr Doherty in particular, was

given detailed consideration at pages 5-7 of the decision letter. At page 18 the

“Whilst it is accepted that the trauma resulting from a trafficking experience can lead

to some victims being unable to recall facts, it is equally as (sic) reasonable to assume

that a potential victim of trafficking relating an experience that occurred to them will

be more expressive and include sensory details such as what they saw, heard, felt or

thought about an event, than someone who has not had this experience.”

[46] The analysis of medical evidence at pages 5-7 forms the background which is

referred to at page 18 in the following passage complained of by the petitioner:

“As noted above a Psychological Report and correspondence from medical

professionals have been received. It is noted that you were diagnosed as suffering

from PTSD and all medical evidence submitted has been fully considered. However,

it is noted that within the various information received regarding your mental

health, no suggestion has been made that you suffer from any form of cognitive

impairment, to explain your inability to recount certain facts regarding your alleged

[47] This suggests acceptance of the evidence about trauma and not rejection of it. I

consider this passage to demonstrate that the decision-maker was fully aware of the PTSD

diagnosis and other related information but, whilst it was accepted and taken account of, it

was not considered to provide sufficient mitigation for parts of the petitioner’s account

where there was a surprising lack of detail, some of which were set out at pages 17 and 18.

Indeed it is very difficult indeed to envisage how the symptoms and consequences of PTSD

could account for some of the most fundamental difficulties in the petitioner’s account

which I consider below; for example her claim to know nothing (prior to flying to London)

of the ZY identity in relation to which she was involved in obtaining documentation at two

embassies in Copenhagen and in which she studied at Kea over a period of months.

[48] Turning to the point mentioned at para [27] above, I am not persuaded that the

decision-maker did accept the petitioner’s account of how she came to the UK. She accepted

in the three page letter of 6 March 2018 that the petitioner’s experiences within the UK

constituted trafficking but that is as far as it went. Against a background of the

decision-maker finding that the petitioner’s account lacked credibility and should be

afforded little weight, I am not persuaded that this demonstrates acceptance of the

petitioner’s account about who came with her to London and what he did thereafter.

[49] More generally, I am not persuaded that there was anything irrational about

accepting part of the petitioner’s account whilst rejecting other parts. In the first place, as a

matter of generality a finder of fact is entitled to accept one part of an account from a

witness whilst rejecting another part. Secondly, insofar as the UK is concerned, there was a

body of supportive evidence such as the circumstances of the petitioner coming to the

attention of the police in Glasgow and evidence of her PTSD and all of the information from

TARA (Trafficking Awareness Raising Alliance), Community Psychiatric Nurses and

Dr Doherty’s psychological assessment of the petitioner’s condition in 2015. Not only was

there material available to support her account of her experiences within the UK, on the face

[50] The position relating to Denmark was different and it had implications which bore

relevantly on the circumstances in which the petitioner left China. It was a reasonable

inference that the petitioner must have applied to participate in a course at Kea before

March 2009, at which time on her own account the petitioner may well have been in China,

although that cannot be known with certainty. The paucity of information which the

petitioner could provide as to the airport by which she says she left China was considered.

Even allowing for the care which must be taken where an account comes from someone who

had been traumatised, the respondent was entitled to consider this to be a weakness in the

[51] It was also a reasonable inference that somebody must have paid fees for the

petitioner’s attendance at Kea. On the information available at the time, it was reasonable to

conclude that those fees would have exceeded 12000 Euros. As the decision-maker noted,

this did not sit easily alongside an account of the petitioner being sold and trafficked to

settle a debt. The analysis of information and the conclusion that the petitioner must have

known of the identity of ZY born August 1990 was a reasonable one which tended to

undermine the credibility of the complainer’s account that she had no knowledge of that

identity. The petitioner must have attended at the Chinese and British Embassies in

Denmark in order for her photograph to be in the passport and for her to have obtained a

visa to enter the UK. Even allowing for the risk of succumbing to a myth, and allowing for

the petitioner’s explanation that threats were made to her own safety and that of her mother,

her account of relative freedom of movement at times in Denmark, whilst not inevitably

destructive of her being a trafficked person there, was capable of undermining aspects of her

account, particularly when viewed alongside the factors identified relating to the ZY

passport and the petitioner’s admitted attendance at what must have been Kea.

[52] I am not persuaded that the decision-maker erred by failing to consider trafficking as

a process. The petitioner’s whole account of events over more than five years was

considered against relevant law and guidance, but the evidence available in relation to

different chapters of that account was different in quantity and quality as I have discussed in

the preceding paragraphs. The specific point about Mr Nai is discussed at para [48] above.

[53] Whilst the respondent ascertained that the petitioner had used an identity and travel

documents in the name ZY born September 1990, at no time was a conclusion reached that

this was the petitioner’s true identity. The letters of 6 March 2018 proceeded on the basis of

both identities and facts were considered on the hypothesis that the petitioner’s true age and

date of birth was that which she stated in giving the name LY, as she consistently did in her

dealings with investigative and therapeutic agencies and individuals in the UK. The

primary importance of the ZY identity is that related facts and circumstances about

passports, a visa and the means of their acquisition, and information from Kea which was

gleaned therefrom, were apt to cast considerable doubt generally on the petitioner’s account

[54] Given the conclusions I have reached in the preceding paragraph, I consider there to

be no substance in the argument that the decision-maker failed to consider possibilities other

than the ZY passport being genuine and obtained by the petitioner. The decision-maker’s

treatment of the ZY passport and identity discloses no error of law. In any event, as

Mr Webster submitted, had this been a live issue the approach of the Upper Tribunal in

Tanveer Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] INLR 345 at

paragraphs 35-36 would have been germane. In the petitioner’s case it could not be

maintained that the decision-maker failed to consider the information relating to identity as

[55] I find no substance in the argument that the absence of an explicit reference to the

impression formed over the telephone, that the petitioner’s accent was consistent with her

coming from one part of China and not coming from another, was a material failure to have

regard to relevant information. It seems likely that this information was amongst the UKVI

notes to which reference was made in the decision letter. However, even if it was missed,

this fact could not provide any meaningful support for any part of the petitioner’s account

which was rejected as lacking credibility. It might have had some slight significance in

supporting her general account of moving from one part of China to another when her

mother took up with another man, but the respondent accepted that the petitioner was

sexually abused as a child in China. That acceptance deprives this point of any force at all.

[56] I am not persuaded that the decision-maker made any material error in law in

reaching the decision complained of which was reasonably open to her on the information

[57] I shall reserve all questions of expenses.

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